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THE DUTY TO CONTROL THE CONDUCT
OF ANOTHERt
POSEY M. KIME*
FOWLER V. HARPER**

Whether a person is under a duty to make any effort to
control the conduct of another to avoid harm to a third person
presents a problem in the law of Torts which is generally treated
as one of affirmative obligation. The distinction between misfeasance and mere non-feasance is an old one and, while the
line is recognized as shadowy in places, it still affords a practical
basis for analysis. Whether given conduct is to be described
as the improper performance of proper acts or a failure to
perform acts which should have been performed is the orthodox
touch-stone for deciding many tort cases. 1 To be sure, this
formula is capable of manipulation, and any given set of facts
can be compressed to come within the concept of non-feasance
or expanded to fit the mould of misfeasance. The trick is a
simple one of selecting that point in the series of happenings
from which the analysis is to start.2 An accident at a level
crossing, for example, may be logically regarded as the result
of the mere failure of the engineer to sound a warning or make
timely application of his brakes; on the other hand, it can be
regarded as the improper operation of the locomotive. In the
former description, the logic is the one of non-feasance; the
latter is that of misfeasance. Actually, the formula is superficial
and inexact. The basic principles, however, for determining
duty are the same in all cases. A sounder basis for analysis is
the relationship of the parties. If the conduct of the actor has
brought him into a human relationship with another, of such
* Reprinted from Yale Law Journal, April, 1934, with the permission
of that periodical.
* Judge, Appellate Court of Indiana.
** Professor of Law, Indiana University.
1 See Bohlen's Studies in the Law of Torts, p. 83.
2 See Harper, Law of Torts, § 81, p. 204.
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character that sound social policy requires either some affirmative
action or precautions in action on his part to avoid harm, the
duty to act or take the precautions is imposed by the law.
"Given a relation," says Justice Cardozo with characteristic
insight, 3 "involving in its existence a duty of care .. ., a
tort may result as well from acts of omission as of commission
in the fulfillment of duty thus required by law. What we need
to know is not so much the conduct to be avoided when the
relation and its attendant duty are established as existing.
What we need to know is the conduct that engenders the relation.
It is here that the formula, however incomplete, has its value
and significance."
Justice Cardozo has thus deftly pointed out the actual basis
of policy for the distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance. The man who has undertaken a definite course of
continuous action thus brings himself into relation with other
human beings within the zone of possible danger, to an extent
which requires that precaution against bodily harm to such
persons as a reasonable man under the circumstances would
take. If he fails to do so, this is characterized as misfeasance.
In other words, an actor is always under the duty to see that
other persons are not immediately exposed to an unreasonable
risk from his acts. On the other hand, a previous course of
action, not in itself creating risks to others, may have brought
the actor into certain socially recognized relations with others
which are of such a character as to require affirmative acts
to protect them from risks which the person thus required to
act had no part in creating. The failure to perform such an
act is described as non-feasance. To minds of less insight than
that of Justice Cardozo, the situation is more easily comprehended by treating the latter situation as the only one depending
upon the relationship of the parties. The principle is thus
ordinarily formulated that while an actor is always bound to
prevent his acts from creating an unreasonable risk to others,
he is under the affirmative duty to act to prevent another from
sustaining harm only when certain socially recognized relations
exist which constitute the basis for the legal duty.
Accordingly, it may be said that there is ordinarily no general
duty to act for the protection of others. As formulated in the
3 Moch Co. Inc. v. Rennselaer Water Co. (1928), 247 N. Y. 160, 159
N. E. 896.
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Restatement of Torts,4 "The actor's realization that action on
his part is necessary for another's aid or protection does not
of itself impose upon him a duty to take such action." The
application of this principle to the specific problem of the duty
to control another's conduct to prevent harm to a third person
results in the generalization that, ordinarily, there is no such
duty. Certain situations there are, however, in which the social
relationships of the parties are of such a character that the
law imposes the affirmative duty upon one person to attempt
to control another's conduct to avoid an unreasonable risk to a
third person. There are two kinds of relationships which give
rise to this duty. The relationship between the defendant and
the person who threatens the harm to the third person may
be such as to require the defendant to attempt to control the
other's conduct. On the other hand, there may be a relationship
between the defendant and the person exposed to harm which
requires the defendant to afford protection from certain dangers
including the conduct of others. It is the purpose of this article
to consider a few situations in which this duty is present.
CHARACTER OF THE DUTY

The cases which constitute the basis of this investigation
disclose that the problem is primarily one of negligence. There
is no duty to control another's conduct at the risk of the actor.
The problem is not one of action or failure to act at peril.
There is no duty to control the conduct of another human being
which corresponds to the absolute duty imposed by common law
to control the activities of certain animals, in which case the
duty is to prevent, in all events, the animal from causing harm
to another.5 The law might have been otherwise and drawn
an analogy from the duties of one who harbors a wild animal.
For obvious reasons, however, it has not done so. There are,
for example, sufficient considerations for a less onerous duty
on the part of a parent to control the conduct of his minor child,
even though a vicious one, than for one who harbors a vicious
animal to control the activities of the beast. A man is not
4

Restatement of Torts, § 192 (Tentative Draft No. 4).

IsMay v. Burdette (1846), 9 Q. B. 101; Copley v. Wills (Tex. Civ. App.

1913), 152 S. W. 830; Hays v. Miller (1907), 150 Ala. 621, 43 Son. 818;
Opelt v. Barnes (1919), 41 Cal. App. 776, 183 Par. 241.
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required to harbor a wild animal. If he chooses to do so, he
cannot complain that the common law imposes upon him the
risk that the animal shall exhibit its wild character and attack
another. He may exercise all the care of which he is capable,
but nevertheless be held for the unfortunate consequences of
his conduct. On the other hand, the time has not yet come
when parents can exercise the same volition with respect to
the rearing of a family, and while, as everyone knows, children
have many of the same vicious propensities of animals, sufficient
reliance is placed upon the veneer of civilization to reduce the
recognizable risks to a point much lower than those involved
in the harboring of animals.
Thus, the duty involved in controlling the conduct of human
beings is at most the duty to exercise reasonable care so to
control conduct as to prevent harm to others. The risk against
which the attempt to exercise control must be exercised may
be either action on the part of the other intended to harm a
third person, or action on his part which constitutes negligence
toward the third person. A parent, therefore, as will be seen,
may be under a duty to exercise reasonable care so to control
the conduct of his minor children as to prevent the child from
intentionally attacking another or from so acting that its conduct
constitutes a recognized and unreasonable risk of harm to the
third person.
RELATIONSHIP OF DEFENDANT TO PERSON CAUSING HARM

(a)

Another's Use of Defendant's Chattel in His Presence.

The fact that another is using a defendant's chattel in the
latter's presence has, at least under certain circumstances, been
regarded as a sufficient basis for an affirmative duty on the
part of the defendant so to control the conduct of the other
as to prevent him from unduly endangering third persons. A
number of cases involving the driving and operation of vehicles
have seemingly involved this doctrine. 6 One of the earliest
cases involved the liability of the possessor of a horse and
6 Samson v. Aitchison (1912), L. R. A. C. 844; Bell v. Jacobs (1918),
261 Pa. 204, 104 Atl. 587; Kelly v. Thibodeau (1921), 120 Me. 402, 115
Atl. 162; Pratt v. Patrick (1924), 1 K. B. 488; Beaudion v. Mahaney
(1932), - Me. -, 159 Atl. 567; Wheeler v. Darmochwat (1932), 183
N. E. 55 (Mass.).
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carriage who permitted a guest to drive the horses. 7 Through
the negligent driving of the guest while the possessor was in
the carriage, an injury was caused to a third person. The action
was brought against the possessor and he was held liable, not
for the negligence of the driver, but apparently for his own
fault in failing to exercise that care which was proper on his
part to prevent the driver from being negligent. "He is the
party in possession," said the court, "he is present, he has the
actual control."8 A Pennsylvania case9 arrived at the same
result although the basis thereof was clearly that of master
and servant. This was also a horse-drawn vehicle case in which
the owner had permitted his guest to take the reins while he
sat in the carriage with him. The court reasoned that since
the owner had the choice of the person to do the driving and,
as owner, had the right to control his actions while driving
and the right to retake the reins at any moment, the owner
was liable for the driver's negligence as his master.1 0 A later
English case 1 involved the application of the same reasoning
to the driving of an automobile. Here a prospective purchaser
desired her son's advice before buying the vehicle. The defendant's agent, a salesman in charge, took the prospective customer
and her son for a demonstration and during the demonstration
permitted the son to drive the car. iThe inexperienced son
injured a traveler who brought an action against the defendant
as owner of the vehicle. The court held the defendant liable
on the ground that, being in possession of the automobile and
thus in a position to direct and control its operation, it was
chargable with the negligence of the driver.
It is to be observed that in very few of these cases is the
principle enunciated with that clarity which would indicate the
difference between vicarious liability and liability for the defendant's own default. In many of the cases, the court is obviously
attempting to rationalize the result as the application of the
doctrine of respondeat superior. 12 In other cases the courts do
Wheatley v. Patrick (1855), 2 M. & W. 650, 150 Engl. Repr. 917.
8 Ibid. 2 M. & W. 650, 652, 150 Engl. Repr. 917, 918.
9 McMahen v. White (1906), 30 Pa. Super. 173.
7

lo Ibid. 30 Pa. Super. 173.
11 Sampson v. Aitchison (1912), L. R. A. C. 844.

12 See McMahen v. White (1906),
30 Pa. Super. 173; Beaudion v.
Mahaney (1932), 159 Atl. 567 (Me.); Doyon v. Mossoline Motor Car Co.

(1923), 98 N. J. L. 540, 120 Atl. 204. Of course, it is clear that some of
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not predicate liability upon that ground, but upon the ground
that the possessor, having as such, an ability to control the
driver, is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to do so.
Thus in a Massachusetts case, 13 the court said, "When it appears
that an owner of an automobile is riding in it while it is being
driven by another in an improper manner, and there is no evidence indicating a contractural surrender, nor evidence of abandonment of the owner's right to control it, the inference is warranted that the owner knew of and permitted its improper operation and thus became responsible for the consequences." The
fact that, in such cases, the operator of the car is negligent
has misled many courts to regard the liability of the owner
and possessor as based upon the driver's negligence when it
should, in most instances, be based both on the driver's negligence and the negligence of the possessor in failing to exercise
care to prevent the driver's negligent operation of the vehicle.
It is to be observed that if the owner or possessor were liable
for the negligence of the driver, it would be immaterial whether
or not he "knew of" or "permitted the improper operation" of
the car.
The ordinary grounds of respondeat superior are seldom if
ever available to adequately explain the possessor's liability in
these cases. While the case of Sampson v. Aitchison' 4 might
have been explained as a case of joint enterprise upon the
theory that the driver and the owner were mutually interested
in the demonstration of the car,'3 the emphasis in the opinion
was placed upon the fact of possession by the defendant and
the accompanying control over the driver. The formula of
"control" is emphasized by nearly all the courts. It is not the
"joint" or "mutual" control which is emphasized in joint enterthe cases extend liability so that it is actually vicarious.

Thus, in Doyon

v. Mossoline Motor Car Co., supra, and in Beaudion v. Mahaney, Inc., supra,
the holding seemed to be that the owner of the car whose agent was
demonstrating it, was liable for the negligence of the prospective purchaser
who was driving it. These cases, all, can probably be explained as cases
of joint enterprise. The same may be said for Samson v. Aitchison (1912),
L. R. A. C. 844. See Slater, J. in Brooke v. Bool (1928), 2 K. B. 578, 585.
13 See for example Wheeler v. Darmochwat (1932), 183 N. E. 55

(Mass.).
14 (1912) L. R. A. C. 844.
15 See Robison v. Oregon-Washington R. Co. (1918), 90 Ore. 490, 176
Pac. 594; Fisher v. Johnson (1925), 238 ll. App. 25. See Note (1929)

77 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 676.
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prise, but the defendant's exclusive control over the situation.
"Collins, when he took the wheel came under the control of the
defendant, ...

If

Collins had been going too quickly and

Sampson had told him to go slow and Collins had persisted in
going too quickly, Sampson would have had the right to say
to him: 'If you wish to continue to drive my car you must
drive it as I direct, and if you will not do so you must cease
to drive it.' In such circumstances Collins would have had to
obey orders or cease driving."' 16 The "control" aspect of these
cases is to be sharply distinguished from "control" as it is
employed in the cases involving master and servant or joint
enterprise. Control as the basis for the master's liability for
the servant's negligence is obviously a fictitious control. 17 The
master is liable whether he in fact had any control over his
servant or not. So too, in the case of joint enterprise, the "joint
control" of the parties seems primarily a convenient device
whereby the extraordinarily difficult question whether one person
should be held vicariously responsible for the negligence of
the other can be passed by the judge to the jury.'S In the present
problem, however, the word "control" is apparently honestly
employed to indicate the fact that a driver of a vehicle will
ordinarily comply with the wishes and directions of the owner
of the car. "Control" is, therefore, used in a very real sense.
The rationale of this situation is indicated by the interesting
comparison between the duty of the possessor of the vehicle
to control the driving of a guest and the apparent lack of duty
of a guest to control the driving of the owner to protect third
persons. No case has been found in which a guest in a carriage
or an automobile has been held liable to a third person injured
by the owner's negligent driving for failing to control the
driver. This is perfectly consistent with common sense. If
A is the gratuitous guest of B in the latter's car, A naturally
feels reticent about offering suggestions and criticisms of B's
driving. Such back-seat operation of a motor vehicle is not
only commonly regarded as discourteous but is invariably
resented by the owner of the car. On the other hand, if B,
the owner, permits a guest to drive the car, B does not feel
10 (1912) L. R. A. C. 844, 850.
17 As where the servant commits a tort while engaged in an act pro-

hibited by the master.
18 See Harper, The Law of Torts, § 148.
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the same reticence about warning of excessive speed or other
dangerous operation, nor does the guest resent such suggestions.
It is commonly felt that the fact of possession and ownership
carries with it the privilege of direction and control of the
manner in which the vehicle is operated. It is to be noticed,
however, that a great mass of authority establishes the rule
that even a gratuitous guest must protest against the driving
of the owner if the guest is himself endangered thereby. 19 In
other words, while the guest is under no duty to attempt to
control the driving for the protection of third persons, he is
under a very definite duty to attempt to control the driving
for his own protection. 20 But again the explanation is obvious.
Even a gratuitous guest is felt justified in protesting against
acts of the owner in driving the car if the guest is himself
exposed to an unreasonable risk. While "back-seat driving"
by the guest is regarded as normally improper, the fact that
the guest's own safety is imperiled by the possessor of the car
is ample justification therefor. This is a mere matter of self
defense against negligence. The situation is comparable to the
rules governing self defense against another's conduct intended
to injure the actor. He is always privileged to use reasonable
force to protect himself from an attack. But the common law
has not extended this privilege for the protection of third
persons unless the person threatened is a member of the actor's
family or, in some other way is under his protection. 21 If the
actor intervenes to protect another not under his protection,
he takei the risk that the other is himself privileged to defend
himself.2 2 In other words, the actor under such circumstances,
has no privilege of his own but can avail himself only of such
privilege as the person to whose aid he goes might have. It
19 Crescent v. Anderson (1886), 114 Pa. 643, 8 AtL. 379; Bush v. Union
Pa. R. Co. (1901), 62 Kans. 709, 64 Pac. 624; Cahill v. Cincinnati etc.
R. Co. (1891), 92 Ky. 345, 18 S. W. 2.
20 See cases collected in 18 A. L. R. 309 and 47 A. L. R. 293.
21 See e. g. State v. Douglas (1919), 115 S. Car. 483, 101 S. E. 648;
Gossett v. State (1905), 123 Ga. 431, 51 S. E. 394; Sloan v. Pierce (1906),
74 Kans. 65, 85 Pac. 812; Tompkins v. Knut (1899), 94 Fed. 956; Frew v.
Teagarden (1922), 111 Kans. 107, 205 Pac. 1023; Barfoot v. Reynolds
(1733), 2 Str. 953, 93 Eng. Repr. 963.
22 Utterback v. Commonwealth (1899), 105 Ky. 723, 49 S. W. 479; Obier
v. Neal (1913), 1 Houst. (Del.) 449; Morris v. McClellan (1908), 154 Ala.
639, 45 So. 641. But see Warnack v. State (1908), 3 Ga. App. 590, 60
S. E. 288.
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would seem clear that if there is no privilege to protect third
persons from an assault, a fortiori there is no duty to protect
them from mere negligent conduct. Thus, it is that, just as
there is no general privilege to assist third persons when threatened with the intentional inflicton of bodily harm by another,
there is no general duty to control another's negligent driving
to protect third persons exposed to harm thereby, although
there is such a duty to protect oneself.
Whether this rule is peculiar to the operation of vehicles
or whether it is safe to make generalizations therefrom may be
questionable. To be sure, the operation of an automobile is a
particularly dangerous activity and this fact is, of course, a
factor of importance. It is suggested, however, that its importance lies only in the application of the standard of reasonableness, and not in the question of whether the possessor is under
the duty to act as a reasonable man in an attempt to control the
other's conduct. It is to be remembered that the courts have
generally refused to place the automobile in a different legal category from other chattels solely because its use is more likely to
cause accidents than the use of other chattels. 23 It is quite
obvious that a reasonable man will foresee danger from the
operation of an automobile when there would be no recognizable
risk from the use of other chattels, and it is submitted that
the principle involved in the cases under discussion is one which
should receive general application to the use of other chattels.
(b)

Relctionship of Parent and Chid.

The relationship of parent and minor child affords a sufficient
basis for the affirmative duty on the part of the parent to
exercise his parental control to prevent it from intentionally
or negligently harming others. Here again, the relationship
23

See, e. g. the reluctance of courts to rest the results of the "family

automobile doctrine" cases on the grounds that an automobile is a dangerous
instrumentality. Compare Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson (1920),
80 Fla. 441, 86 Sou. 629, with Herr v. Butler (1931), 101 Fla. 1125, 132
Sou. 815 and Engleman v. Traeger (1931), 136 Sou. 527, as to which see
(1932), 81 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 60. And see Parker v. Wilson (1912), 179
Ala. 361, 60 Sou. 150; Hartley v. Miller (1911), 165 Mich. 115, 130 N. W.
336. Compare also the refusal of the New York Court of Appeals to base
the liability of the manufacturer of an automobile to the ultimate user
for negligence in its construction upon the grounds that the automobile is
inherently dangerous. McPherson v. Buick Motor Co. (1916), 217 N. Y.
382, 111 N. E. 1050.

DUTY TO CONTROL CONDUCT OF ANOTHER

507

does not make the parent as such liable for the torts of his
minor child.24

He is, however, liable for his own torts, and

this liability may arise out of the failure to perform definite
acts to control the child when, as a reasonable parent, he should
recognize that such control is necessary to prevent the child
injuring third persons. Again, these cases are to be distinguished from those in which the child is in fact the servant
of the parent, in which case the doctrine of respondeat superior
is sufficient to impose liability upon the parent. 25 A distinction
is likewise to be drawn between the situation in question and
the case where the parent furnishes or turns over to his child
a chattel which, in view of the child's immaturity is likely to
be so used that it will cause harm to others. In such a case,
the relationship of parent and child is unimportant. Liability
would be imposed were the relationship absent. Thus, a parent
who furnishes his minor child with an automobile which he
is incapable of driving with reasonable care is liable if the
child negligently injures a third person;20 but he is also liable
if he furnishes an automobile to an adult stranger under similar
circumstances. 27 In such a case, the parent is liable because
of his active misconduct; he has actually created an unreasonable
risk to others by placing a chattel in the hands of a person
whose use thereof is likely to create a recognizable risk to third
persons.
The problem in question involves the parent's liability for
the failure to perform the affirmative duty of action to prevent
his child injuring third persons. There is ample authority to
sustain the imposition of such a duty.28 Thus, where a parent
24 Zeeb v. Bohnmaier (1918), 103 Kans. 599, 176 Pac. 326; White v.
Seitz (1931), 342 Ill. 266, 174 N. E. 371; Norton v. Payne (1929), 154
Wash. 241, 281 Pac. 991; Hulsey v. Hightower (1932), 44 Ga. App. 455,
161 S. E. 664; Chaddock v. Plumer (1891), 88 Mich. 225, 50 N. W. 135.
25 Teagarden v. McLoughlin (1882), 86 Ind. 476; Hower v. Ulrich
(1893), 156 Pa. 410, 27 Atl. 37; Trabon v. Smith (1922), 239 S. W. 345
(Texas).
26 Hopkins v. Droppers (1924), 184 Wis. 400, 198 N. W. 738 and see
note 36 A. L. R. 1164.
27 Mitchell v. Churches (1922), 119 Wash. 547, 206 Pac. 6.
28 Charlton v. Jackson (1914), 183 Mo. App. 613, 167 S. W. 670; Hoverson v. Noker (1884), 60 Wis. 511; Thibodeau v. Cheff (1911), 24 Ont. L.
Rep. 214; Stewart v. Schwartz (1914), 57 Ind. App. 249; Daggy v. Miller
(1917), 180 Iowa 1147; Norton v. Payne (1929), - Wash. -, 281 Pac.
991; Ryley v. Lafferty (1930), 45 Fed. (2) 641; and see Bollinger v. Rador
(1910), 69 S. E. 497 (N. Car.).
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had knowledge of the habit of his minor child of beating other
children with sticks, he was held liable because he had failed
to exercise that control which a reasonable parent should have
exercised to correct the child's vicious instincts. 29 The parent
had not furnished the child with the club with which he beat
the plaintiff, the child was not performing any service for
the father at the time, nor did the father actively participate
in the child's misconduct. Liability was imposed because the
father had failed to exercise care to correct the child's dangerous
propensities. So too, in a recent case, a parent was held liable
for an assault made by his child when it appeared that the
parent had knowledge of the child's habit of bullying smaller
children and had not taken reasonable steps to correct the
evil.3 0

Said the court, "While it is true that parents are not

liable for torts committed by their minor children without their
consent and knowledge, yet the principle applicable to the facts
alleged in this case is that the parents are liable if it appears
that they knew that their child was guilty of committing the
particular kind of tort habitually..

. .,

and made no effort to

correct or restrain him."3 1 In a Wisconsin case, 32 it was held
that a father wh had knowledge that his minor children were
in the habit of scaring horses passing on the highway, was
bound to use reasonable care so to control them as to prevent
the plaintiff's horses from being frightened. Again, in an
Ontario case, 3 a parent was held responsible to a plaintiff whose
straw had been burned by the defendant's imbecile child when
it appeared that the parent had knowledge of the child's propensity to play with matches and had failed to exercise the
care required of him to prevent the child from playing near
the straw.

In an Indiana case, 34 a parent was held liable for

failing to prevent his children from stretching a rope across
a highway whereby the plaintiff, while bicycling, ran against
the rope and was thrown to the ground sustaining bodily injury.
In a number of these cases, it seems apparent that the courts
are struggling to find the appropriate basis for liability. In
many of them, the parent is connected with the tort of the
2
9 Norton
3

v. Payne (1929), - Wash. -, 281 Pac.991.
0RyIey v. Lafferty (1930), 45 Fed. (2) 641.
3MIbid. 45 Fed. (2) 641, 642.
32 Hoverson v. Noker (1884), 60 Wise. 511.
38 Thibodeau v. Cheff (1911), 24 Ont. L. Rep. 214.
34 Stewart v. Schwartz (1914), 57 Ind. App. 249, 106 N. E. 719.
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child by his knowledge of the propensities of the child. This
knowledge is referred to as an "acquiescence" or "consent" to
the actual tort, 35 although it is admitted that at the time thereof,
the parent did not in fact know that the wrongful act was
being committed. The fictitious character of this reasoning
is obvious. It is an attempt to hold the parent by forcing the
case either within the well-known rule that an actor who participates in the commission of a wrong in any way is a party
to it, or that the "consent" to the wrongful acts, thus fictitiously
inferred, constitutes an authorization to the child to act on
behalf of the parent. However, consideration of the facts in
these cases, together with the unanimity of results argues
strongly that the parent is held because he has failed to exercise
the care which a reasonable parent should exercise to prevent
his child from creating an unreasonable risk of harm to third
persons.
It is suggested in none of these cases that a parent may be
liable for his failure so to rear and train his child as to make
it amenable to discipline. Parents might properly be horrified
at the thought of being held legally responsible for the efficacy
of their disciplinary measures. The issue of negligence, therefore, must be focused upon a particular failure of the parent
to adopt reasonable measures to prevent a definite type of
harmful conduct on the part of the child. General responsibility
for the rearing of incorrigible children is not involved.
(c)

Other Cases Where Defendant has Special Ability to Exercise Control Over Another.

There are other situations which involve the principle that
a special relationship between one person and another which
gives the one a definite control over the actions of the other
carries with it the duty to exercise care to control the conduct
of the other to protect third persons. A unique English case
illustrates the principle in an extraordinary situation.3 6 The
defendant had permission from the plaintiff to go into the latter's
shop at night when the plaintiff was gone to see that the, place
was secure. On one occasion, the defendant took with him a
friend who, detecting the odor of escaping gas, struck a match
35 See Thibodeau v. Cheff, supra, note 33; Norton v. Payne, supra
note 29.
36 Brooke v. Bool (1928), 2 K. B. 578.

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

in an attempt to discover its source. The discovery was made
easy by the ensuing explosion which damaged the plaintiff's
goods. The defendant was held liable on the theory that his
friend was present on the premises solely in the right of the
defendant and that the latter thus had the peculiar ability to
control his friend's conduct. His failure to exercise reasonable
care so to do was a breach of a duty toward the plaintiff. "The
defendant was in control of the enterprise," said the court.
"It was only by his permission and at his invitation that Morris
was in the shop, and he had a right to require Morris to leave
the shop at any moment." 37
The relationship of master and servant, it seems, affords
the master a peculiar ability to control the conduct of the
servant in some instances, even beyond the ambit of activity
commonly designated as the scope of the employment. Some
acts are so clearly disconnected with the purpose of the employment and so exclusively done by the servant on his own account
that they are clearly not of a character such as to make the
master liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior. Nevertheless, these acts may be so connected with the employment
in time and place as to give the master a special opportunity
to control the servant's conduct. In an interesting case decided
by the United States Supreme Court,38 a defendant railroad
company was held liable when a piece of timber thrown by a
member of the crew of a passing train struck the plaintiff and
caused serious injury. It appeared that the train crews frequently engaged in such conduct to the knowledge of the company and that, although they so acted entirely outside the scope
of their employment, the company owed the duty to individuals
to correct such dangerous conduct. "It is not a question of
scope of employment or that the act of the individual is performed by one who has ceased for the time being to be in the
employment of the company. The question is, does the company
owe any duty whatever to the general public or, in other words,
those individuals who may be in the streets through which
its railroad tracks are laid, to use reasonable diligence to see
to it that thdse who are on its trains shall not be guilt of any
act which might reasonably be called dangerous and liable to
37 Ibid. (1928) 2 K. B. 578, 584.

38 Fletcher v. Baltimore, etc. R. Co. (1897), 168 U. S. 135, 42 L. Ed.

411, 18 Sp. Ct. 35.
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result in injuries to persons on the street, where such act could
by the exercise of reasonable diligence on the part of the comThe court held that such a duty
pany have been prevented ?"
of Appeals arrived at a similar
Court
York
New
The
did exist.
of a factory for failing
owner
the
result when it held liable
articles out of the winthrowing
from
to prevent its workmen
40
below.
street
the
on
dow at persons
Persons having special professional knowledge or skill may
be so associated in the practice of their profession as to require
one to exercise appropriate care so to control the conduct of
the other as to avoid an unreasonable risk to third persons.
And this is true although neither is the servant of the other
and although neither is vicariously responsible for the negligence of the other under the "joint enterprise" formula. In a
recent Idaho case, 4 1 an action was brought against a surgeon
for burns sustained by the patient when a hot water bottle
was negligently left in her bed while she was still under an
anesthetic. The evidence disclosed that the defendant had not
himself placed the hot water bottle in the bed nor had he
prepared the patient's bed. On the other hand, the evidence
disclosed that quite probably the mistake had been that of a
special nurse, not the defendant's servant. He was held liable,
however, because being in control of the entire proceedings
and in charge of the patient it was his duty to exercise reasonable
care to see that the patient was not exposed to risk of harm
by the conduct of any of the persons attending her, whether
independent contractors or not. The principle was recognized
by the United States Circuit Court of Appeals in the following
case. 42 The defendant was in charge of the plaintiff during
her confinement but another physician was called in for the
delivery. After consultation it was agreed that the use of instruments was necessary and the other physician used the forceps,
presumably without sterilizing them. The plaintiff was severely
lacerated as a result of the operation and contracted blood poisoning. In stating the principles which determined the defendant's liability, the court explained: "Two physicians, independently engaged by the patient and serving together by mutual
39 Ibid. 168 U. S. 135, 140.
40
41
42

Hogle v. Franklin Mfg. Co. (1910), 199 N. Y. 388, 92 N. E. 794.
Davis v. Potter (1931), 2 Pac. (2) 318 (Idaho).
Morey v. Thybo (1912), 199 Fed. 760.
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consent, necessarily have the right, in the absence of instructions to the contrary, to make such a division of service as, in
their honest judgment, the circumstances may require. Each
must not only bring to the case the ordinary knowledge and
skill of the profession, but also give his best personal attention
and care. . . . Each, in serving with the other, is rightly held
answerable for his own conduct, and as well for all the wrongful
acts or omissions of the other which he observes and lets go
on without objection, or which, in the exercise of reasonable
diligence under the circumstances, he should have observed."
An obvious application of the principle under discussion would
seem to be situations in which the defendant has control over
another who is by reason of some social or mental maladjustment
a dangerous person. Thus, person in charge of penitentiaries
or insane asylums would seem clearly to come within this rule.
It was so held in a Maine case 43 in which the State was held
liable in an action of tort when the superintendent of an insane
hospital negligently liberated a patient who was dangerous
to the community and who subsequently destroyed the plaintiff's
property by fire. On the other hand, the problem is frequently
confused by inappropriate discussion of proximate causation.
Thus, the Louisiana Court refused to hold liable the superintendent of an insane asylum who negligently released a patient
afflicted with an incurable homicidal mania who subsequently
killed the plaintiff's husband. 44 The court thought that the
defendant's negligence was not the proximate cause of the death.
The fallacy here is obvious. There is ample support for the
proposition that the negligent or criminal intervening act of
another will not cut off the necessary causal relation between
a defendant's negligence and a plaintiff's harm if the intervening
criminal act was foreseeable by the defendant. 45 Here the
very risk which constitutes the defendant's negligence is the
probability of such action. It is obvious that when such action
occurs, it should not insulate the defendant's negligence under
43Jones Co. v. State (1923),

122 Me. 214, 119 Atl. 577.

And see

Missouri, etc. R. Co. v. Wood (1902), 66 S. W. 449 (Texas).
44 Cappel v. Pierson (1931), 15 La. App. 524, 132 So. 391, as to which
see (1931) 45 Harv. L. Rev. 192.
45 St. Louis-San Francisco R. Co. v. Mills (1925), 3 Fed. (2) 882
(C. C. A.); Bower v. New York C. etc. R. Co. (1913), 91 N. J. L. 190,
103 Atl. 166; Fordon v. Bedand (1929), 265 Mass. 40, 164 N. E. 734;
Beatty v. Dunn (1931), 103 Vt. 340, 154 Atl. 770; Marshall v. Caledonian
R. Co. (Scot. 1889) 1 Sess. Cas. (5th Ser.) 1060.
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the causation formula. In other words, it is clearly unsound
to afford immunity to a negligent defendant because the very
intervening force, the anticipation of which made his conduct
negligent, has brought about the anticipated harm.
RELATIONSHIP OF DEFENDANT TO PERSON INJURED

(a) Persons Under Specia Protection of Defendant.
Where a person is under the special protection of another,
the other is bound to exercise reasonable care to prevent harm
to the person under his protection, and this duty may include
protection from the dangerous conduct of third persons. The
relationship of parent and child is the obvious example of this
situation. The problem here, however, is rendered largely academic because of the general incapacity of a child to recover
from its parent for a tort against its person. 4 6 If, however,
the child is under the protection of a stranger who thus occupies
the position of its parent, the action may be maintained. 4 7 Hence
a child may recover from a guardian step-parent or other person
in loco parentis for failure to afford that protection to the child
which the law requires. The protection required in such a
case includes protection against the dangerous activities of third
persons, when it is reasonably necessary to the child's safety.
An interesting Kentucky case neatly illustrates the point.48 Here
a young girl was taken into a defendant's home to work for her
board and for a small weekly sum while she attended school.
The defendant's son, to the knowledge of the defendant, made
advances to the girl and made frequent excursions to the child's
bedchamber, the defendant making no serious effort to restrain
him. The father of the girl brought an action against the
defendant for the child's seduction. The plaintiff's action was
designated as an action for breach of contract but the court
held that the complaint stated a cause of action in tort as the
defendant had been charged with negligence in failing to protect
the girl under his protection. "One who stands to a child in
46 McKelvey v. McKelvey (1903), 111 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664; Foller
v. Roller (1905), 37 Wash. 242, 79 Pac. 788; Bulloch v. Bulloch, 45 Ga.
App. 1, 163 S. E. 708; Smith v. Smith (1924), 81 Ind. App. 566, 142 N. E.
128.
47 Treschman v. Treschman (1901), 28 Ind. App. 206, 61 N. E. 961;
Clasen v. Pruhs (1903), 69 Neb. 278, 95 N. W. 640.
48 Cashen v. Riney (1931), 40 S. W. (2) 339.
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loco parentis," said the court, 49 "has the same rights and duties
during the continuance of this relationship as the parent and
is bound to use the care incumbent upon a parent to protect
such child from evil and injury. . . It (the contract) was
merely an undertaking to perform such duties as were incumbent
upon them in the absence of a contract where they had the
custody and control of an immature child. The contract merely
recognized the immaturity of Isabel and the necessity on the
part of those having custody and control of her to exercise
the care and duty incumbent upon a parent to protect her...
A person standing temporarily in loco parentis may not shut his
eyes to obvious danger threatening the moral or physical wellbeing of the child committed to his custody and plead non-liability
when injury, due to his failure to exercise that degree of care
incumbent upon him under the circumstances, results."
Where the custody of a person is by law entrusted to another
under circumstances which deprive the person of the normal
means of defending himself, there is a duty upon the person
in charge to exercise reasonable care to afford that protection
to the other of which the custody deprives him. Thus, the
state, where it is responsible in tort, as well as sheriffs, wardens
or other persons in charge of prisoners is bound to exercise
care to afford the protection to the prisoner from the dangerous
conduct of third persons which the prisoner by reason of his
incarceration is incapable of finding elsewhere.O
Not only is the sheriff or jailer required to protect his prisoner
against the violence of an infuriated mob when he has reason
to believe that public opinion is incensed against the prisoner
to the point where an attack is likely to be made upon him, 5 1
but he must exercise reasonable care to protect him against his
fellow prisoners when such protection is reasonably necessary.
Several cases have arisen in which a prisoner has been attacked
by another inmate of the prison as a result of the "kangaroo"
49 Ibid. 40 S. W. (2) 339, 341-343.
50 Indiana ex rel. Tyler v. Galin (1889), 94 Fed. 48; Logan v. U. S.
(1892), 144 U. S. 263, 36 L. ed. 429; Asher v. Cabell (1892), 50 Fed. 818;
Hixon v. Cupp (1897), 5 Okla. 545, 49 Pae. 927; Kusah v. McCorkle (1918),

100 Wash. 318, 170 Pac. 1023; Eberhart v. Murphy (1920), 110 Wash. 158,
188 Pac. 17, 194 Pac. 415 and see Ex parte Jenkins (1900), 25 Ind. App.
532
5' Indiana ex rel. Tyler v. Gobin (1889), 94 Fed. 48; Logan v. U. S.
(1892), 144 U. S. 263, 36 L. ed. 429.
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courts which have been tolerated from time to time in certain
penal institutions.5 2 All these cases have placed emphasis upon
the fact that the duty of reasonable protection to the prisoner
must necessarily accompany his imprisonment and the ensuing
inability to protect himself. It is clear that not only are there
dangers peculiar to the imprisonment, but the prisoner is peculiarly helpless to protect himself from these dangers. Thus,
the very fact that a person is imprisoned on a charge of certain
offenses may so incite the passion of the community that he
is in grave danger of mob violence. Again, incarceration with
a group of persons who because of their social maladjustments
are well known to have vicious and dangerous propensities, at
once exposes a person to risks which are serious and obvious.
The circumstances of the prisoner's arrest or confinement ordinarily make him utterly helpless to protect himself either by
self-defensive means or by flight. The duty in such cases is,
of course, only the duty to exercise reasonable care, and where
a warden or jailor has neither the legal authority nor ability
to obtain additional guards for the protection of his prisoner,
he could not be found guilty of negligence in failing to do so.
Even in such cases, however, he is bound to employ the ability
which he has to afford reasonable protection to those in his
custody.
It has been held that the relationship of master and servant
creates certain obligations on the part of the master to afford
protection to the servant from certain dangers of the employment
which do not come within the ambit of the risks assumed by
the servant on accepting employment. Thus, the master has
been held under a duty to use care to mitigate the effects of
bodily harm sustained by a servant in the course of the employment by administering first aid.5 3 So too, the employer has
been held under a duty to afford his servant protection against
extremely inclement weather when the employment exposed the
servant to unusual risks. 5 4 And there are recent cases which
impose upon the employer the duty either to protect or warn
52 Hixon v. Cupp (1897), 5 Okla. 545, 49 Pac. 927; Kusah v. MeKorkle
(1918), 100 Wash. 318, 170 Pac. 1023.
53 Rasch v. Elite Laundry Co. (1906), 98 Minn. 357, 108 N. W. 447;
Ohio etc. R. Co. v. Early (1894), 141 Ind. 73, 40 N. E. 257; Harris v.
Pa. R. Co. (1931), 50 Fed. (2) 866, as to which see (1931) 30 Mich. L. Rev.
479. And see also (1932) Corn. L. Q. 505.
54 Shoemaker v. St. Paul, etc. R. Co. (1891), 46 Minn. 39, 48 N. W. 559.
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a servant of danger from the conduct of third persons where
the danger arose out of the work.55 In one case, the defendant
railroad company was held liable for a failure to exercise reasonable care to advise a train guard in its employ of a train robbery
of which it had been forewarned. Caught unaware by the
robbers, the guard lost his life. It was true that the decedent
knew the general risks of his work and assumed such risks in
so far as they were an incident of his employment. By failing
to warn him when it had knowledge of a specific peril, however,
the defendant deprived him of the opportunity to which he was
entitled to protect himself, and was properly held liable. Here
again, the analogy of the privilege of the master to defend his
servant against acts of third persons intended to harm the
servant is helpful. Though having no independent privilege
to defend others generally, an actor may defend his servant
against an apparent assault without taking the risk that the
servant is not privileged to defend himself. As to risks not
known to the servant and not customary to the employment
but arising out of it, the master seems under a duty to use reasonable care to warn the servant if he knows of danger or has
peculiar knowledge thereof, and this includes threatened harm
from the dangerous conduct of others.
(b)

Carrier and Passenger.

There is abundant authority for the liability of a carrier
whose servants have failed to exercise reasonable care so to
control the conduct of some of its passengers to prevent either
an intentional harm to other passengers 56 or to prevent conduct
which constitutes an unreasonable risk of harm to them. 57 As
early as 1865, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania discovered
that "the carrier is the protector by law of each passenger
against the malice, the brutality or the drunkenness of his fellow
55 David v. Missouri Pac. R. Co. (1931), 41 S. W. (2) 179, noted in
(1932) 30 Mich. L. R. 806; St. Louis, etc. R. Co. v. Mills (1925), 3 Fed. (2)
882 (C. C. A.).
56 New Orleans, etc. R. Co. v. Burke (1876), 53 Miss. 200; Birtton v.
Atlanta etc. R.Co. (1883), 88 N. C. 536; Pittsburg etc. R. Co. v. Richardson
(1907), 40 Ind. App. 503; Cline v. Milwaukee etc. R. Co. (1911), 146 Wisc.
134; Koch v. Brooklyn etc. R. Co. (1902), 78 N. Y. S. 99; Murphy v.
Western etc. R. Co. (1885), 23 Fed. 637; Flint v. Norwich etc. Transport
Co. (1868), 34 Conn. 554; Pittsburg etc. R. Co. v. Hines (1866), 53 Pa. 512.
57 Chicago etc. R. Co. v. Fisher (1916), 61 Ind. App. 10, 110 N. E. 240;
Nute v. Boston etc. R. Co. (1913), Mass., 10D N. E. 1099.
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travelers." 58 Other courts soon followed in extending the duty
to include not only protection against attacks and assaults in
actual progress, but to require precautions to prevent harm
whenever the carrier has reasonable ground for believing that
violence is imminent. This duty today requires the carrier not
only to intervene when violence is actually in progress or. is
imminent but to exercise reasonable vigilance and supervision
of passengers whose known character or condition is likely to
make them a danger to fellow passengers. 59
Corresponding to the duty to protect passengers against
wrong-doers is the ancillary privilege on the part of the carrier
to use force against the persons creating the disturbance or the
risk of harm. 60 This privilege to use force against the one is
co-extensive with the duty toward the other passengers, and
not only justifies the carrier in either ejecting the offenders or
restraining them until they can be turned over to police authorities when they are actually engaged in violence, but permits
the carrier to control their conduct to prevent harm to other
passengers at some future time.61 In the exercise of such privilege, the carrier must not, of course, employ excessive force
against the offender and it must use reasonable care not to
expose other passengers to danger during the process of expelling the wrongdoer.6 2
In a few states, it has been held that the carrier is not only
bound to exercise reasonable care to protect its passengers from
the conduct of others which threatens their bodily safety, but
to protect them against conduct which is insulting and discourteous.6 3

This curious rule requires a carrier to protect its passen-

gers against conduct which is not even tortious on the part of
58 Pittsburg etc. R. Co. v. Hinds (1865), 53 Pa. 512.

59 Cline v. Milwaukee etc. R. Co. (1911), 146 Wise. 134, 131 N. W. 427;
Nute v. Boston etc. R. Co. (1913), - Mass. -, 100 N. E. 1099; Chicago

etc. R. Co. v. Fisher (1916), 61 Ind. App. 10.
60 Baltimore etc. R. Co. v. McDonald (1879), 68 Ind. 316; Edgerly v.
Union etc. R. Co. (1892), 67 N. H. 312; Sorenson v. Lincoln Traction Co.
(1913), 94 Nebr. 9L
61 Vinton v. Middlesex R. Co. (1865), 93 Mass. 304; Berry v. Carolina
etc. R. Co. (1911), 155 N. C. 287.
62Thayer v. Old Colony etc. R. Co. (1913), 214 Mass. 234, 101 N. E. 368.
63 Lucy v. Chicago etc. R. Co. (1896), 64 Mim. 7, 65 N. W. 944; Southern R. Co. v. Lee (1910), 167 Ala. 268, 52 So. 648; Haile v. New Orleans
etc. R. Co. (1914), 135 La. 229, 65 So. 225; Philips v. Atlantic Coast Line
R. Co. (1931), 160 S. Car. 323. Contra, St. Louis etc. R. Co v. Taylor
(1907), 84 Ark. 42.
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the persons indulging therein. Thus, the carrier in these cases is
held liable because its'servants failed to exercise care to protect
a passenger from the insulting conduct of one who was not
himself liable to the passenger. The cases have mostly been
those in which a woman has been exposed to the ribald talk
or profanity of the carrier's servants or her fellow passengers.
This is really a direct protection of the interest in emotional
tranquility-a protection which seems to be afforded only against
carriers. It may be that a carrier should be required to furnish
reasonably decent and comfortable, as well as reasonably safe
facilities, but the cases seem not sufficiently numerous to draw
far reaching generalizations, except perhaps when the insults
are made by the carrier's servants themselves.
(c)

Use of Land by Business Visitors.

The possessor or occupier of land who holds it open to business
visitors is under the affirmative duty to see that the land is reasonably safe for the reception of such visitors or to use reasonable care to warn them of any unreasonably dangerous condition
thereof.6 4 A parallel duty is imposed upon the occupier of the
land to use reasonable care to protect his business visitors not
only from his own dangerous activity but from the conduct of
third persons, whether other business visitors or trespassers.
If the dangerous activity is conducted by the possessor's independent contractor or concessionaire, the possessor is under the
duty of exercising reasonable care to control or regulate the
conduct of the activity to prevent it from constituting an unreasonable risk to his business guests. 65 Thus, in an early case
the management of a public fair was held liable because a concessionaire conducted a shooting gallery at the fair in an unreasonably dangerous manner which resulted in the plaintiff's
injury. 66 The same duty is imposed upon the occupier to control
the conduct of other business visitors upon his land. 6 7 And
Restatement of Torts, § 213 (Tentative Draft No. 4).
65 Restatement of Torts, § 214 (Tentative Draft No. 4).
66 Conradt v. Clauve (1883),
93 Ind. 476.
64

67

Exton v. Central etc. R. Co. (1899), 62 N. J. L. 7; Mastead v.

Swedish Brothern (1901),

83 Minn. 40, 85 N. W. 913; Indianapolis etc.

R. Co. v. Dawson (1903), 31 Ind. App. 605, 68 N. E. 909; Blakeley v.
White Star Line (1908), 154 Mich. 635, 118 N. W. 482; Moone v. Smith
(1909), 6 Ga. 649.
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indeed, a recent case has held liable the possessor when the
risk was created by felonious trespassers on the premises.6
The duty in these cases, as in other cases of the duty of a
possessor of land to his business visitors is an alternative one.
It can be discharged either by using reasonable care to protect
the business guests against the dangerous activity of the wrongdoers or, where such is possible, by giving them warning adequate to afford the opportunity on their part of assuming the
risk of harm or protecting themselves by leaving or remaining
away from the land. 9 In the absence of an adequate warning,
however, the possessor of the land may not only be under the
duty of using such ability as he has at the time to protect his
business visitors, but if he knows of the danger in advance,
he must use reasonable care to be prepared to meet it when
it becomes imminent. Thus, an Indiana case 7o held that the
management of an amusement park was under the duty of
employing sufficient guards to maintain peace and order in the
park and to protect its patrons, and that the fact that it had
knowledge that a group of white men were conspiring to insult
and attack negroes frequenting the park required the management either to warn the intended victims or to employ an additional number of police and guards. In the case of a public
utility, of course, it is frequently impossible for the duty of
the utility to its patrons to be discharged by a mere warning.
If the only way for a patron to avoid the risk is to forego or
relinquish the service of the utility, warning on the part of the
carrier is not a discharge of its duty. In this respect, a carrier
is in a position different from other business invitors. The
duty imposed upon the carrier or other utility to furnish service
to all members of the public prevents it from shifting the risk
of harm from the dangerous activities of third persons to the
patron by a mere warning. In such a case, the duty which the
carrier owes to the public is to furnish it with reasonably safe
service and this includes protection against the misconduct of
third persons as well as protection against risks incident to
the defective condition of the utility's equipment.
68 Sinn v. Farmers Dep. Savings Bank (1930), 300 Pa. 85, 150 At.
163, as to which see (1931) 79 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 368.
09 Blakeley v. White Star Line (1908), 154 Mich. 635, 118 N. W. 482;
Indianapolis St. R. Co. v. Dawson (1903), 31 Ind. App. 605, 68 N. E. 909.
70 Indianapolis St. R. Co. v. Dawson (1903), 31 Ind. App. 605.
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CONCLUSION

From the foregoing discussion, it appears that a considerable
number of cases have imposed an affirmative duty to control the
conduct of third persons to prevent danger to others in two
general types of situation. In one type of case, the defendant
has been in some special relationship with the person whose
conduct he is required to control which gives him a peculiar
ability to affect such person's conduct; In the other type of
situation, the defendant has been in some special relationship
with the person threatened or injured which entitles such person to the protection of the defendant. Some of the cases discussed under the one or the other of these categories fall into
rather well recognized groups; others represent unusual and
rare fact situations. The policy, however, is not difficult to
recognize in all of them. This policy is a dominant one in the
law of torts. It emphasizes again the relational character of
tort law. Human beings by their activities have all sorts of
dealings with each other and come into all sorts of relations.
Some of these relations are tenuous, and to these the law
attaches no special obligations. Others are regarded as of sufficient importance that a sound and stable social order requires
certain assurances of safety to person and property on the part
of the parties thereto. The social policies which determine what
relationships require special assurance of safety and what ones
are sufficiently unimportant not to require them are so incredibly complicated as almost to defy analysis. These policies
in the main reflect the general attitude of the community. They
represent for the most part the popular notions of whlat constitutes proper assumptions on the part of one person when dealing
with another. The common law attempts to interpret these
communal reactions and to crystalize them in rules of law. As
business and social relations become more and more complicated,
these reactions are modified on the one hand and extended on
the other. This requires modification and extension of the common law. The principles governing the duty of one person to
control the conduct of another have this general elasticity which
characterizes other principles of tort law. Therefore, when new
and novel cases involving the problem arise, it will become the
duty of the judges to examine the analogies of such cases as are
discussed here and to determine whether, in the light of human
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experience as reflected in the decisions, the relations of the parties fall into one or the other of the general divisions mentioned.
If, on the whole, it seems that it is not desirable to add to the
number of fact situations falling within these two general divisions, no affirmative obligation will be imposed. If, on the other
hand, the relationship of the parties appears to be, for all practical social purposes, indistinguishable from the type of cases
which have been included under these general divisions, the common law may add another cubit to the immense stature which it
has acquired over centuries of constant growth.

